This study examines whether mutual life insurers pay policyholder dividends in response to the costs of managerial discretion. The insurer's free cash flow and the variation in free cash flow explain over 85 percent of the variation in policyholder dividends for a time-series, cross-sectional sample of mutual life insurers. The findings hold under different specifications of the estimated model and for a control sample of stock life insurers.
INTRODUCTION
Costs associated with managerial discretion reduce the value of a corporation. Selfinterested managers make corporate decisions that maximize their own utility of wealth rather than that of corporate owners. As explained by Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) , these costs arise from managers attempting to invest corporate cash below the cost of capital, or wasting it on organizational inefficiencies rather than distributing cash to corporate owners. Mutual policyholders, in their dual role as customers and owners, are likely to be susceptible to these costs. Unlike publicly traded corporations for which external capital and labor markets provide inexpensive monitoring and a mechanism for the removal of ineffective managers, mutual life insurers make relatively little use of capital markets.
1 Thus, takeovers are impossible and scrutiny of firm performance by capital markets is weak. Likewise, while the costs of managerial discretion between owners and fixed claimholders are common among stock firms, they are not significant for mutual insurers.
Although, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) contend that regulatory scrutiny can mitigate the costs of managerial discretion, empirical evidence on the efficiency of regulation of life insurers is equivocal (Record, Society of Actuaries, 1989; BarNiv and Hershbarger, Nicos A. Scordis is an Assistant Professor of Insurance and Finance in The College of Insurance, New York, NY. S. Travis Pritchett is the W. Frank Hipp Professor of Insurance at the University of South Carolina. 1 Some old borrowing by New England Mutual that is now part of Metropolitan Life and some recent borrowing by Prudential are exceptions. Surplus notes are becoming an important source of borrowing, however, having grown from $400 million outstanding at the end of 1981 to $9.2 billion at the end of 1995 (Belth, 1996). 1990; Babbel and Hogan, 1992; Klein, 1995) . Furthermore, Boose (1990) and Wells, Cox, and Gaver (1995) , respectively, do not find a relationship between regulatory intensity and insurer performance, or regulatory intensity and the size of the insurer's free cash flow (i.e., cash in excess of what is required to invest in all available positive net present value projects).
This study investigates whether the payment of policyholder dividends is related to the costs of managerial discretion in mutual life insurers. As Mayers and Smith (1988) point out, the costs of managerial discretion in mutual insurers (property and liability) are generated by manager-policyholder (owner) conflicts. Although the individual equity of policyholder dividend distributions has been investigated by Winters (1978) , Belth (1978) , Cody (1981) , and Larsen (1981) none of these studies investigates the relationship between the payment of policyholder dividends and the costs of managerial discretion in mutual life insurers.
2 Garven and Pottier (1995) argue that just as the payment of stockholder dividends reduces the costs of managerial discretion in noninsurance corporations, the payment of policyholder dividends also reduces the costs of managerial discretion in stock life insurers. But, Garven and Pottier are silent on whether the payment of policyholder dividends also reduces the costs of managerial discretion in mutual life insurers. However, Formisano (1978) finds that the payment of policyholder dividends is a tradeoff between retaining cash as surplus and paying it out as dividends. Indeed, Wells, Cox, and Gaver (1995) find that managers of mutual life insurers hold more free cash flow as compared to managers of stock life insurers. This implies greater costs of managerial discretion in mutual life insurers, which Well, Cox and Gaver suggest can be mitigated by policyholder dividends.
This study demonstrates an empirical relationship between the payment of policyholder dividends and the costs of managerial discretion in mutual life insurers, using data on 80 mutual life insurers for 1985 through 1993. The findings are consistent with an environment where managers pay increased policyholder dividends in order to bond the usage of free cash under their control. The findings hold under different specifications of the estimated model, and for a control sample of stock life insurers with participating policies.
Background literature is described in the next section. Following a description of data and the research design, results and conclusions are presented.
BACKGROUND LITERATURE

Effectiveness of Managerial Control
Managers can neutralize internal controls by seeking fixed salaries (Walsh and Seward, 1990) . Mayers and Smith (1992) find that the compensation of mutual insurer executives is less responsive to company performance than that of executives with stock insurers even though the compensation of mutual executives is lower than that of stock executives. Mayers and Smith (1986) and McNamara and Rhee (1992) provide further evidence of the ability of management to neutralize the oversight effectiveness of the board of directors. They find, respectively, that when stock life insurers become mutuals, managerial turnover declines; likewise, managerial turnover increases when mutual insurers demutualize. Furthermore, once the initial board of directors is appointed for a mutual insurer, removal of directors by policyholders is difficult because policyholders are allowed minimal participation in electing their company's board of directors.
3
Alternative managerial disciplinary mechanisms, however, exist. Mayers and Smith (1981) were the first to suggest that the issuance of participating policies, both exclusively and in conjunction with non-participating policies, reduces costs of managerial discretion. However, Mayers and Smith further contend that stock insurers have an advantage in controlling costs of managerial discretion. Indeed, Wells, Cox, and Gaver (1995) find that mutual insurers maintain higher levels of free cash flow than stock insurers. This implies greater costs of managerial discretion in mutual life insurers.
While stock insurers seem to have less severe costs of managerial discretion than mutual insurers, it is not clear that stock insurers outperform mutuals. Mayers and Smith's (1986) examination of the mutualization of 30 stock life insurers finds that some stakeholders were better off as a result of mutualization while no stakeholder appeared to be worse off. Boose (1990 Boose ( , 1993 finds differences between the performance of mutual and publicly traded life insurers but cannot refute the possibility that the observed differences are due to differences in sales force expenses rather than home office expenses. Armitage and Kirk (1994) provide evidence from the United Kingdom that mutual life insurers outperform their stock counterparts in competitiveness and efficiency, as measured by average pay-out rates on identical policies and average cost ratios, respectively. Garven and Pottier (1995) , explain how participating policies in stock insurers may control the costs of managerial discretion. They use an option valuation framework to show that the expected cash flows associated with participating life insurance policies resolve costs of managerial discretion in stock insurers. Casual empirical evidence supports their hypothesis. Wells, Cox, and Gaver (1995) rely on the empirical findings of Mann and Sicherman (1991) to suggest that even though policyholder dividend payment 3 In New York, for example, the owners of a mutual life insurer are allowed one vote per policyholder, regardless of the number or value of their policies. Voting by proxy is allowed, unless the insurer's board of directors requires voting by ballot only. To obtain a list of eligible voters a petition, signed by 25 eligible voters, must be filed with the New York Superintendent of Insurance. Policyholders have the right to oppose the management ticket if they first circulate another petition signed by at least 500 eligible voters. There is no requirement that an agenda be circulated prior to the company meeting. The spirit of the regulations governing the election of directors of mutual insurers domiciled in New York is typical of other jurisdictions.
Policyholder Dividends as a Mechanism for Managerial Control
schedules that are part of sales illustrations are non-guaranteed, management endeavors to meet these schedules out of a desire to develop and maintain a good reputation. Policyholders of mutuals cannot obligate management to distribute accumulated funds because, as a matter of law, they have no ownership rights to this cash (White Fuel Corporation v. Liberty Mutual, 313 Mass 165, 46 N. E. 2nd, 548, 1943) . While managers are undoubtedly reluctant to reduce dividends, history reveals significant downward movements. In an examination of the present values of illustrated and actual policyholder dividends, Palmer (1976) is not able to verify the reliability of dividend illustrations. Since 1991, probably as a result of surplus strengthening following the failure of several insurers in 1991 and falling interest rates, many mutuals have reduced dividend scales. Nevertheless, participating policies strongly encourage the payment of significant policyholder dividends, which according to Formisano (1978) and Saunders (1989) reduce the cash resources accumulated by management. Empirical evidence from non-insurance stock corporations suggests that a reduction of cash resources available to inefficient management reduces costs of managerial discretion (Lehn and Poulsen, 1989; Lang, Stulz, and Walkling, 1991; Mann and Sicherman, 1991) .
In summary, the potential for sub-optimal usage of cash resources by managers of mutual insurers creates a need for monitoring and controlling the use of resources available to management. Mutual policyholders, which have incomplete information, incur monitoring and bonding costs in their effort to assess managerial productivity. These costs (plus residual costs) are the costs of managerial discretion. Many mutual policyholders who perceive the costs from managerial misuse of funds to be greater than the benefits of maintaining their contracts will surrender their contracts for cash. The post-1991 rehabilitation experiences of Fidelity Mutual Life and Mutual Benefit Life underscore the consequences for management when policyholders decide to surrender their contracts. These two mutuals faced a surge of guaranteed insurance contract and other policy surrenders which created liquidity crises, resulting in takeovers by regulators (Special Report of the A. M. Best Company on Insolvency of Life and Health Insurers 1976 , 1992 . To avoid this forced conversion, the managers of mutual life insurers may reduce the quantity of free cash under their control by voluntarily paying larger policyholder dividends. Reducing the quantity of free cash also reduces the costs of managerial discretion.
DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN
Data
Annual observations for 1985 through 1993 for a sample of 80 United States mutual life insurers are used to test the validity of the hypothesis that the payment of policyholder dividends is related to the costs of managerial discretion. The 80 insurers account for almost 85 percent of total policyholder dividends paid by the population of United States mutual life insurers during the period of the study.
Insurers in the sample write only participating policies, have no common stock outstanding, and are on the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) database. Descriptive statistics are in Table 1 . 
Research Design
It is proposed that the variation in policyholder dividends paid by mutual life insurers can be explained by the costs associated with monitoring cash flow usage by management. The following linear multiple regression model is estimated:
The subscripts i and t represent individual insurers and years, respectively. PDP = policyholder dividends paid, FCF = free cash flow, ADMFCF = absolute deviation of annual free cash flow from the mean free cash flow, INT = the interaction represented by free cash flow multiplied by the absolute deviation of annual free cash flow from the mean free cash flow, and VI = volume of insurance in force. 4 All variables are expressed in dollars. The use of dollar denominated variables is possible since this study utilizes information on how the policyholder dividend behavior of individual insurers varies over time (in addition to variation among insurers).
Policyholder Dividends Paid
The dependent variable in the model is measured at time t, while the independent variables are measured at t-1. This specification is consistent with state insurance codes that require managers of mutual life insurers to decide at the end of each year the total amount of policyholder dividends to be distributed during the next year. Therefore, the total amount paid as policyholder dividends in any given year results from decisions made the previous year.
Policyholder dividends paid are measured in dollars rather than as a payout ratio. Negative earnings were reported in at least one year by 18.3 percent of the insurers, while they continued to pay policyholder dividends. Thus, using a ratio of policyholder dividends paid to earnings would result, at times, in a negative quantity. The interpretation of a negative payout ratio would be problematic.
Costs Associated with Monitoring Free Cash Flow
It is costly for policyholders when management uses free cash flow in a way that does not maximize policyholder utility of wealth. Costs of managerial discretion exist because management knows the size of free cash flow better than policyholders. Jensen (1986) suggests that the costs of managerial discretion are intensified when the corporation generates plentiful free cash flow, while Stulz (1990) suggests that volatile free cash flow increases the likelihood that management will either over-invest, or under-invest.
Following Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) , this study posits that all other things being equal, larger free cash flow and more volatile free cash flow will result in larger cash related costs of managerial discretion. If managers of mutual life insurers pay out policyholder dividends in order to reduce the costs of managerial discretion, the estimated coefficients of free cash flow (FCF) and its deviation (ADMFCF) are expected to be positively related to policyholder dividends paid (PDP). Free cash flow is calculated as in Well, Cox, and Gaver (1995) with the exception of total stockholder dividends which are zero for the sample of mutual life insurers. Stulz (1990) , further suggests that the cost of monitoring managerial performance should be at its highest when free cash flow is both large and volatile. To examine how both a large and a volatile free cash flow affects policyholder dividends, a multiplicative interaction term (INT) is included in model (1). The interaction term is the insurer's free cash flow multiplied by its deviation (FCF x ADMFCF).
Control Variable. To control for the insurer's size, the volume of life insurance in force (VI) is included in model (1). The volume of life insurance in force is appropriate for this study because the vast majority of policyholder dividends paid by life-health insurers are those for life policies. Policy based measures of size have been used by Pritchett (1973) , Fields (1988) , and Bernstein (1992) . The use of volume of life insurance as a control for the insurer's size is especially appropriate for this study because if the mutual's managers follow pure actuarial theory to decide total policyholder dividends, all other things being equal, a mutual insurer that has a large volume of life insurance in force will also have higher policyholder dividends. However, if managers of mutual life insurers are solely motivated by their desire to reduce the cash related costs of managerial discretion when making decisions about policyholder dividends, the volume of life insurance in force may not explain any of the variation in policyholder dividends. Thus, the hypothesis tested in this study favors an estimated coefficient of the volume of life policies in force (VI) that is not significantly different from zero.
RESULTS
In the estimated model, none of the conditional indexes are greater than 30 and associated with variance-decomposition proportions of greater than 0.5. Thus, according to Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980, 115) collinearity is not a problem in the estimated model. However, the residuals of the estimated model are heteroskedastic and first-order autoregressive. The heteroskedastic and autoregressive consistent estimates of model (1) have been obtained through the use of a feasible generalized least squares estimator similar to that of Prais and Winsten (1954) . Table 2 , shows the estimated regression coefficients of model (1) for the 80 insurers for 1985 through 1993. As expected, the coefficients of free cash flow and absolute deviation in free cash flow are directly related to policyholder dividends. Also, as expected, the estimated coefficient of the interaction variable is inversely related to policyholder dividends. The estimated coefficient of the volume of life insurance in force is not significantly different from zero. According to the regression estimates of model (1), policyholder dividends increase by $0.033 for each dollar of free cash flow in year t-1. For every dollar free cash flow in year t-1 deviated from the insurer's mean free cash flow, policyholder dividends increase by $0.051.
6
The sign reversal of the interaction variable is not uncommon. It implies that for every dollar that free cash flow increases, the effect of the free cash flow's deviation on policyholder dividends decreases. Similarly for every dollar the deviation of free cash flow increases, the effect of free cash flow on policyholder dividends decreases.
7 This is consistent with an environment where managers bond their usage of the corporation's cash resources through the payment of policyholder dividends, even though, from an economic perspective the moderating relationship captured by the interaction variable in model (1) is weak. The moderating relationship captured by the interaction variable affects the estimated coefficients of free cash flow and the deviation of free cash flow only at the fourth decimal place, but the estimated elasticities of cash flow and its variance decrease when the interaction variable is not included in the model. The payment of policyholder dividends reduces the free cash under management's control, which reduces the costs of managerial discretion. Evaluated at the sample mean, the estimated elasticities of free cash flow, absolute deviation in free cash flow from the mean cash flow, and the interaction variable, with respect to policyholder dividends, are 0. 668, 0.259, and 0.126, respectively. 8 The adjusted R² for an ordinary least square estimation of the model is 86.49 percent. Hsiao (1986) shows that the use of a time-series, cross-sectional sample design such as the one in this study, in conjunction with the estimation of a first difference model controls for the effects of misspecified variables. Therefore, as a control, model (1) is re-estimated using the first differences of each variable. Panel B of Table 2 shows these estimated results. For each dollar the prior year's free cash flow received by the insurer changes from the year before (FCF t-1 -FCF t-2 ), policyholder dividends change by $0.026. Also, for each dollar that free cash flow the insurer received the prior year deviates from the insurer's mean free cash inflow as compared to the year before (ADMFCF t-1 -ADMFCF t-2 ), policyholder dividends change by $0.049. As before, the estimated coefficient of the first difference of the interaction variable is inversely related to policyholder dividends. The estimated coefficient of the first difference in volume of 6 The sample was also stratified by admitted assets into four sub-samples of very large, large, medium and small insurers also stratified the sample. Model (1) was estimated for each sub-sample. For very large asset insurers only the deviation in free cash flow is significantly different from zero. The direct relationship between the deviation in free cash flow and policyholder dividends is as predicted. The estimated coefficients of the remaining three sub-samples are consistent with the estimated coefficients of the whole sample for model (1). 7 For a discussion on the usage and interpretation of interaction effects in multiple regression see Boik (1979) , Friedrich (1982) and Jaccard, Turrisi and Wan (1990) . 8 Model (1) with the addition of the prior period's policyholder dividends as an independent variable is also estimated for the sample. Even though the prior period's policyholder dividends are significant, the estimated coefficients of free cash flow and deviation in free cash flow are also significant and similar in magnitude to before. The adjusted R² for an OLS estimation of this model is 49.01 percent.
life insurance in force is not significantly different from zero. The adjusted R² for an OLS estimation of the first difference model is 31.35 percent.
Control for Possible Sample Dependent Results
The current study posits that the payment of policyholder dividends by mutual life insurers is related to the costs of managerial discretion. Garven and Pottier (1995) argue that participating policies issued by stock life insurers contribute in mitigating the costs of managerial discretion for those insurers. Thus, just as the payment of policyholder dividends is related to the costs of managerial discretion in mutual life insurers it could also be related to the costs of managerial discretion in publicly traded life insurers, even though Mayers and Smith (1988) say the costs of managerial discretion in mutual insurers are generated by manager-owner conflicts. As a control, this study investigates the explanatory ability of model (1) over a sample of annual observations for each of the years between 1985 and 1992 for 185 United States stock life insurers. 9 Insurers in the control sample have been selected at random from the population of stock life insurers that write both participating and non-participating policies, and are on the NAIC database. The estimated results of the control sample are consistent with those from the mutual life insurer sample. Policyholder dividends paid by stock insurers increase by less than half of a cent for each dollar of free cash flow in year t-1, and for every dollar free cash flow in year t-1 deviated from the insurer's mean free cash flow, respectively. The moderating relationship captured by the interaction between free cash flow and the deviation in free cash flow is statistically significant. The estimated coefficient of volume of life insurance in force is not statistically significant.
CONCLUSIONS
The potential for sub-optimal usage of cash resources by managers of mutual life insurers creates a need for monitoring and controlling the use of resources available to management. Mutual policyholders, who have incomplete information, incur monitoring and bonding costs in their effort to assess managerial productivity. These costs (plus residual costs) are the costs of managerial discretion. Mutual policyholders that perceive the costs from managerial misuse of funds to be greater than the benefits of maintaining their contracts will surrender their contracts for cash. To avoid this forced conversion; the managers of mutual life insurers may reduce the quantity of free cash under their control by voluntarily paying policyholder dividends. Reducing the quantity of free cash under the control of management also reduces the costs of managerial discretion.
